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The No-Self View and the Meaning of Life 
 
Baptiste Le Bihan 




Several philosophers, both in Buddhist philosophy (see e.g. Zahavi, Thompson, and Siderits 2011) 
and Western philosophy (Unger 1979a, 1979b, 1979c, Stone 2005) have claimed that the self does 
not exist. Such a claim may immediately be rejected because of the incredulous stares and the 
existential threatening it triggers. One might think that it is obvious that the self exists since one 
feels as though one does have a very direct access to one’s self. Or, alternatively, one may claim 
that if the self were to fail to exist then life would be meaningless–thereby perceiving the 
eliminativist claim as an existential threat. A lot has already been written about incredulous stares 
and the roles of experience-based intuitions in metaphysics (see for instance Korman 2009 and 
Benovsky 2015) so, within the scope of the paper, I shall only concern myself–so to speak–with the 
latter resistance, which has received far less attention. The no-self view (also called “eliminativism 
about the self”) might, intuitively, threaten not only our existence as a subject but also the very 
meaning of our lives. Or at least, to put it with more care, the no-self view, at first glance, provides 
us with a reason to believe that life is meaningless. In the present article, after introducing the two 
debates over the reality of selves and the nature of the meaning of life (respectively in section II and 
III), I will argue that eliminativism about the self does not entail that life is meaningless. 
Eliminativism is consistent with many explanations of the meaningfulness of our lives (sections IV 
and V). I will then close by examining how the no-self view relates to practical matters in 
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Buddhism, arguing that eliminativism may even be construed further as partially grounding a 
naturalist account of the meaning of life (section VI).  
 But before getting started, I would like to clarify two dialectical points. First, there is 
something wrong in the idea that a metaphysical view should be rejected for practical reasons. 
Existential threatening, one may argue, should never count as a case against a particular 
philosophical view. Nonetheless, the success of a philosophical view depends not only on its 
objective qualities, but also on its capacity to seduce and convince. Indeed, a view that is too much 
counterintuitive or threatens our ordinary lives in a too radical way is at risk of being rejected 
without serious consideration–thereby not getting the proper attention it deserves. Therefore, I will 
argue indirectly in favor of the no-self view by showing that it does not necessarily entail 
unpalatable existential consequences since the no-self view is consistent with many realist accounts 
of the meaning of life. 
 Second, nihilism1 about the meaning of life is not necessarily problematic. Several important 
figures have endorsed nihilism about the meaning of life (see for instance Camus 1942 and Nagel 
1971). Therefore, the implication from the no-self view to nihilism about the meaning of life is not 
necessarily an issue for the no-self view. In what follows, I merely argue in favor of eliminativism 
about the self by showing that it is consistent with numerous, and especially realist, conceptions of 
the meaning of life. 
 
II. Eliminativism 
In the Western tradition, eliminativism about material objects (including ordinary objects and 
sometimes physical particles2) is a metaphysical theory designed to solve philosophical problems 
like vagueness, persistence through time or material constitution (see for instance van Inwagen 
1990, Merricks 2001, Le Bihan 2016, Benovsky forthcoming). There are several motivations for the 
adoption of eliminativism about material objects.3 An important motivation is that it helps solving 
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several philosophical puzzles. For instance, how is it possible for material objects to remain 
numerically the same through time when these are subject to qualitative changes? An available 
answer is that they do not remain numerically identical to themselves. There are no persisting 
material objects since there are no material objects tout court. One could favor a revisionary 
approach, arguing that material objects do exist although they are instantaneous and do not persist 
across time. It follows, however, that material objects as ordinarily construed in common sense–as 
persisting entities–do not exist. A second motivation arises from the problem of material 
constitution: if one asks whether a statue and the hunk of matter it is made of are one and only one 
object–arguing that for each volume of space-time there is at most one and only one material object 
occupying it–or, by contrast, whether these are two distinct objects–arguing that the statue and the 
hunk of clay have distinct modal properties, for instance because the hunk of matter can survive a 
reshape, contrary to the statue–a possible answer is that neither the statue nor the hunk of matter 
exists. The two notions of “statue” and “hunks of matter” are carving reality into two distinct 
conventional ways. 
 What there is instead of material objects is then a further question. The main option4 is that 
the world is made of mereological simple entities, construed as particles or properties for instance, 
statues and hunks of matter being collections of mereological simples we refer to with different 
modal conventions. And importantly, the world is only made of these mereological simples: 
composition never occurs (a view called “mereological nihilism”). When we refer to so-called 
statues and hunks of matter, we are thus referring to collections (or classes or sets) of simples with 
two guises. As a “statue”, the collection is targeted in association with the modal convention that if 
the collection were to change its macroscopic shape, it would cease to be the same collection. By 
contrast, as a “hunk of matter”, the collection is targeted in conjunction with the modal convention 
that if the collection were to change its macroscopic shape, it would remain the very same 
collection. So the view denies that mind-independent modal properties–as opposed to mind-
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dependent modal concepts–are real. 
 It is quite appealing to hold the same position with respect to both material objects and 
selves by either being realist about the two kinds of entities (the common sense view), or by being 
eliminativist about the two (like Unger 1979a, 1979b, 1979c). Indeed, selves are also supposed to 
change through time: as time passes, the self changes through the constant flux of thoughts and 
feelings. Eliminativism offers, here again, a way out to the problem of identity over time: there is no 
persisting self but only a collection of thoughts and feelings distributed in time and space. Also, a 
self is supposed to be constituted by, or at least, to be dependent on, the existence of bodily and/or 
mental states (in the same way a statue is constituted of a hunk of matter). However, it is worth 
noting that it is possible to entertain different views about the two kinds of entities. For instance, 
van Inwagen (1990) denies the existence of material objects but believes in organic entities. 
Merricks (2001) is eliminativist about material objects but realist about conscious entities. Or, to 
take a last example, Benovsky (2014) endorses eliminativism about material objects and 
reductionist realism about the self.5 These three philosophers are inclined to erase material objects 
from their picture of the world. But they are reluctant (quite understandably) to take the further step 
and claim that there is no self. Each has interesting arguments to defend the asymmetry between the 
two cases. Merricks, for instance, argues that selves have causal powers, which are non-redundant 
with respect to the causal powers of the mereological simples that compose selves. Within the scope 
of the paper, I will not discuss these arguments, though. I will take for granted that a unified 
approach bears interesting theoretical virtues and justifies the broad eliminativist view that material 
objects and selves do not exist.  
 At this stage, it is useful to introduce a distinction between two similar views: eliminativism 
and reductionism. According to reductionism, the self is real, but it is not identical with a Cartesian 
ego. Rather, it is a class or a bundle of feelings and thoughts. Hence, both eliminativists6 and 
reductionists agree that “I” refers to a bundle of mereologically simples, but they part company on 
5 
the metaphysical status of the bundle. For the eliminativist, the existence of a collection of 
experiences does not entail the existence of a self. For the reductionist, on the contrary, this 
collection of experiences is just what it is to be a self. Therefore, according to the reductionist, a 
bundle is an “ontological something”, a unifying device that belongs to the category of relation 
rather than the category of substance.7 In order to get a better grip on the difference between the two 
views, it is useful to appeal to a distinction made by Leśniewski’s (1916/1992) between collective 
and distributive classes. A distributional class is a sum of individuals with no further “wholeness 
material”, no supplementary unified entity. The distributional class of individuals is solely the 
distribution of the individuals under consideration, nothing more. By contrast, a collective class is a 
sum of individuals as a whole. A collective class of particular individuals is not the distribution of 
the particular individuals, but the unity of the considered individuals. Armed with this distinction, 
we may then define eliminativism as the view that bundles are only distributional classes, and 
reductionism as the view that bundles also are unities, collective classes, namely genuine mind-
independent unities. In what follows, I will focus on eliminativism and its consequences for the 
meaning of life. However, it may also be of interest for the reductionist who believes that existence 
without a substratum generates an existential threat. 
The ontological distinction just drawn between reductionism and eliminativism 
substantively differs from the one we find under the same name in contemporary discussions in the 
philosophy of Buddhism, where the no-self view plays a crucial role (see e.g. Zahavi, Thompson, 
and Siderits 2011, Siderits 2016). Indeed, it is common to find the claim that Buddhism suggests 
eliminativism about the self and reductionism about persons (see e.g. Siderits 2016). Two 
distinctions have to be introduced in order to explain the general picture: first, the distinction 
between “self” (ātman) and “person” (pudgala), and second the distinction between “ultimate truth” 
and “conventional truth”. The self refers to a specific inner sense, which is taken to be a component, 
among others, of the person, and acts as a unifying device ensuring the synchronic and diachronic 
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identity of the latter. Eliminativism about the self is the claim that selves are not to be found either 
among the ultimate building blocks of the world (the mereological simples) or among the composite 
entities since from mereological nihilism, it follows that there cannot be cross-temporal composite 
selves. The ontological status of complex persons is more ambiguous. Indeed, persons are regarded 
as conventional entities or, at least, as involved in conventional truths (contrary to selves). 8 
Therefore, the claim that persons exist is a conventional truth–but not an ultimate truth. Persons 
persist across time, enjoying cycles of rebirth, but there is no self (not even conventionally). The 
realization that there is no self then allows us to access a state of enlightenment, namely nirvāna, by 
bringing existential suffering to a stop. In this picture, the distinction between reductionism and 
eliminativism amounts to a distinction between useful and useless conventions: the self is useless, 
entailing eliminativism about the self, when the notion of person is a useful construct, entailing 
reductionism about persons. However, as I will argue, this distinction is orthogonal to the more 
ontological distinction that I introduced above, in a such a way that Buddhism entails that we 
should be eliminativist about both selves and persons. 
In order to see why reductionism in the philosophy of Buddhism sense entails eliminativism 
in the metaphysical sense, we must focus on the nature of conventional truths. How exactly we 
should make sense of conventional truths is a delicate matter since the notion has both an anti-
realist flavor with its conventional aspect and a realist feel because of its appeal to the notion of 
conventional truth. Since reductionism about persons follows from the view that the existence of 
persons is a conventional truth, the interpretation of conventional truths directly impacts the 
ontological interpretation given to reductionism. In what follows, I present a dilemma for the 
interpretation of conventional truths and explain why, as a result, I accept an antirealist reading of 
conventional truths, entailing that reductionism about persons is eliminativism about persons in 
disguise. 
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Here is the dilemma. On the one hand, if the truth-makers of conventional truths are real 
conventional entities, then it entails that the world is made of two domains of entities, mirroring the 
two domains of truths: conventional entities and ultimate entities. Operating under this assumption, 
conventional and ultimate entities do not differ in existence since they are both real. Rather, they 
differ in the kind of existence they own; metaphorically, they have a different existential color. It 
entails that we should not be eliminativists or reductionists about persons: we should be dualists.9 
Indeed, if persons exist as entities belonging to a distinct domain of reality targeted by a distinct 
domain of truths, then persons cannot be ontologically reduced to entities of the ultimate domain 
(although they are related to collections of ultimate entities). Therefore, it is dubious that we should 
accept that conventional truths entail the existence of conventional entities numerically distinct 
from ultimate entities. Furthermore, the very idea that existence might come in different kinds is 
logically problematic as has been argued by Merricks (2017). 
On the other hand, we may regard conventional truth as following only from the existence of 
ultimate entities and as not requiring the existence of conventional entities. Both domains of truth 
would find their truthmakers in the ultimate ontology. In this framework, we act on linguistic 
conventions–we create fictions–pretending that, through these conventions, we refer to real entities. 
But then, conventional truths are conventional fictions–not conventional truths. This interpretation 
seems more in line with reductionism about persons as Siderits conceives of it (the view that 
persons are reduced rather than eliminated because the notion of person is useful), but entails 
ontological eliminativism about persons, not ontological reductionism about persons. Indeed, 
ontological reductionism as I have defined above, is just the bundle theory. But from mereological 
nihilism, it follows that the bundle theory is false: there are no bundles. Therefore, moving from 
language to ontology, we end up with ontological eliminativism about persons. In what follows, I 
will not refer anymore to reductionism and assume that eliminativism about x is the correct way to 
think of conventionalism about x. 10  Therefore, I assume that strictly–ontologically–speaking 
8 
persons are no more real than selves, leaving aside discussions on the correct interpretation of the 
two truths doctrine.11  
 Let us close the section with one last brief clarification. The word “life” conveys (at least) 
two very different notions: biological life and existential life. A biological life is an entity studied 
by biology. Eliminativism about the self may come with eliminativism about biological lives as part 
of a broader eliminativist package. But the two positions stand on independent grounds. Conceiving 
of the world as inhabited by biological entities, but not by selves, is a genuine option. By contrast, 
an existential life is a collection of first-perspective experiences. One important point is that an 
existential life can be real even though no self or biological life is actually steering this existential 
life. In this sense, an existential life might be identified with a disunited distributional class of 
experiences. Let me then refine the claim of this paper as follows: eliminativism about the self does 
not entail that our existential lives are meaningless. 
 
III. The Meaning of Life 
What is the meaning of life? Along a deflationist line, one could construe the very question as being 
meaningless, arguing for instance that it is misleading to construe a life as having a meaning since a 
meaning should be the property of a sentence or a word, not of a material entity (by contrast to 
semantic entities) such as a life. According to an alternative nihilist approach (see Nagel 1971 and 
Murphy 1982, 12-17), there is no meaningful answer to the question, although the question itself 
actually does make sense.12 Within the scope of the paper, I will assume that the question does 
make sense and that it is legitimate to try to propose a concrete answer, rejecting both deflationism 
and nihilism. Indeed, since I want to offer a way to block the path from eliminativism about the self 
to nihilism/deflationism about the meaning of life, I am not particularly interested at the project of 
justifying or discussing the two anti-realist views about the meaning of life (nihilism and 
deflationism). So, in what follows, let us assume that the question is meaningful and may admit of a 
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rational answer.13 
 What does it mean to say that life has meaning or that one should try to give meaning to 
one’s very existence? In order to have a first grip on the notion, it is useful to think about the notion 
of meaningless life, which often manifests in a feeling that some of us toy with from time to time: 
the experience that our life is absurd. As Nagel puts it, describing a particular case of the 
experience of absurdity: 
 
What we say to convey the absurdity of our lives often has to do with space or time: we 
are tiny specks in the infinite vastness of the universe; our lives are mere instants even 
on a geological time scale, let alone a cosmic one; we will all be dead any minute. But 
of course none of these evident facts can be what makes life absurd, if it is absurd. For 
suppose we lived forever; would not a life that is absurd if it lasts seventy years be 
infinitely absurd if it lasted through eternity? And if our lives are absurd given our 
present size, why would they be any less absurd if we filled the universe (either because 
we were larger or because the universe was smaller)? Reflection on our minuteness and 
brevity appears to be intimately connected with the sense that life is meaningless; but it 
is not clear what the connection is. (Nagel 1971, 717) 
 Absurdity may also appear with another contrast, not between scales, but between internal 
and external perspectives. When adopting an outside perspective on life, we may realize that our 
goals do not matter from this external viewpoint. Nagel puts it like this: 
 
The things we do or want without reasons, and without requiring reasons–the things that 
define what is a reason for us and what is not-are the starting points of our skepticism. 
We see ourselves from outside, and all the contingency and specificity of our aims and 
pursuits become clear. Yet when we take this view and recognize what we do as 
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arbitrary, it does not disengage us from life, and there lies our absurdity: not in the fact 
that such an external view can be taken of us, but in the fact that we ourselves can take 
it, without ceasing to be the persons whose ultimate concerns are so coolly regarded. 
(Nagel, 1971, 720)  
 Nagel assumes that we are real and that the problem of the meaning of life pops up from the 
experience of absurdity grounded, in the first case, in the realization that we are almost nothing with 
respect to the size of the cosmos in the first case and in the realization that our goals do not matter 
from an external perspective in the second case. I take eliminativism about the self to yield a similar 
problem of contrast. The believer in eliminativism might believe that we are nothing compared to 
the scales of time and space since we are nothing tout court, and that our first-perspective goals do 
not matter because there is no such first-perspective self.  In other words, eliminativism is a new 
source of worry for our location in the natural world. From an outside perspective, we come to see 
ourselves as being nothing but a collection of experiences resulting in a negative judgment about 
the importance of the goals pursued in these experiences. 
 To get a better grip on these specific questions about the meaning of life in the context of the 
no-self view, let us distinguish between three different but related questions about the meaning of 
life. A first question asks about the correct conception of the meaning of life: what makes a life 
meaningful? Or to put it differently, under what conditions is a life meaningful? For instance, does 
it have to focus on ethics, religion, social achievement, pleasure, or on something else? Let us call 
this question the “substantial question”. Interestingly enough, the substantial question can admit of 
a monist answer according to which only the quest for one of these goals triggers the meaning of 
life or, on the contrary, a pluralist view14 according to which the pursuit of various goals may lead 
to a meaningful life. 
 A second question is about the origin of the meaning of life: what is the source of 
meaningful lives? In a way, this is also asking about what makes a life meaningful (similarly to the 
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substantial question) but it is not asking about the goals we should aim at to live a meaningful life. 
It asks for the ontological source of these goals. Is it to be found outside of the natural world 
(typically in God or souls) or, on the contrary, in the natural world (for instance in decisions, the 
mind or biological laws)? Let us call this question the “origin question”. The origin question is 
deeply connected to the substantial question. Indeed, in order to know what the required conditions 
for living a meaningful life, we have to determine its actual ground. If the source of meaning is God, 
for instance, then the meaning of life can be obtained by fulfilling the purpose that God chose for us 
(this is the “purpose theory”, see Metz 2002). Or to take a naturalist example, if the source is 
grounded in the important decisions we make, then meaning might arise by acting accordingly to 
these decisions. In brief, the requirements for a life to be meaningful depend on the source of 
meaningfulness. 
 A third question is: “what is a meaning of life?” What is the metaphysical profile–the 
metaphysical category–of the meaning of life? Compare this with discussions in analytic 
metaphysics on the nature of properties. It is one thing to ask what properties there are in the world; 
this is another to ascertain whether these properties are tropes or universals. Regarding the meaning 
of life, in the same way, it could be asked what the meaning of life is (compare with “what are the 
natural properties in the world?”); but one may also ask to which metaphysical category it belongs 
(compare with “are properties tropes, universals or something else?”). For instance, is a meaning of 
life literally a meaning? If it is not a meaning, properly speaking, what is it? A value? Or does it 
belong to a sui generis metaphysical category? Let us call this question the “metaphysical question”. 
Since this last question remains neutral with respect to eliminativism, I will leave it aside. I will 
now have a look at the origin and substantial questions in the framework of eliminativism (sections 




IV. Supernaturalist Approaches 
In what follows, I will consider the answers that may be offered to the origin and substantial 
questions when endorsing eliminativism about the self. The goal is to ascertain whether 
eliminativism prevents particular answers to the substantial question, namely to the question of 
what makes a life meaningful. To begin with, following a standard classification (see Metz 2002, 
2007 and Hosseini 2015), let us distinguish between two views about the source of the meaning of 
life: supernaturalism and naturalism. Both views are realist since they take for granted that lives of 
certain individuals are, or can be, genuinely meaningful. They merely disagree on the source of this 
meaning. According to supernaturalism, the meaning of life is to be found, at least partially, outside 
of the natural world in a monotheistic god and, or immortal souls15 (Metz 2002, 2007). According to 
naturalism, by contrast, the meaning of life finds its source in the natural world. My goal is to 
answer the following question: Is eliminativism consistent with naturalism and supernaturalism? 
 Let us focus first on supernaturalism. Supernaturalists fall into three groups. Supernaturalists 
of the first group originate meaning of life in God. They claim that the existence of God is a 
necessary condition for meaning to obtain. According to these God-centered accounts, the 
meaningfulness of our lives is grounded in a relationship with God. A famous answer to the 
substantive question is then the purpose theory: our lives are meaningful when “fulfilling a purpose 
that God has assigned to us” (Metz 2002: 784). The second group of supernaturalists connects 
meaning of life to the reality of supernatural immortal souls. According to these soul-centered 
accounts, the meaningfulness of our lives is grounded in immortal spiritual souls and the fact that 
meaningful lives are lives worth living in the first place (see Metz 2002: 788-792). Finally, the third 
group connects meaning to both God and souls, expressing the view that the two of them are 
necessary conditions for meaning to obtain. 
 Eliminativism about the self is not consistent with soul-centered accounts of supernaturalism. 
Indeed, the meaning of life cannot be found in souls. The notion of soul carries the notion of a 
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substantial self transcending the natural world. The notion of soul is an immaterial unifying device, 
metaphysically loaded, that permits eternal identity through time, and even after the end of time, 
whatever this is supposed to mean. Therefore, if there is no minimal self, it follows that there is no 
soul. 
 What about God-centered supernaturalist accounts of the meaning of life? If the meaning of 
life is to be found outside of the world in God, then it does not bear on mundane entities such as 
human lives. If human lives are selfless distributional classes, God could well have set a purpose for 
them. Still, does it really make sense to construe the world as created or inhabited by God, in the 
framework of eliminativism? Could She have created a world in which there are no souls or selves? 
This sounds at odds with several classical monotheist religions; however, as far as I can see, there is 
no contradiction here. Besides, it is not obvious that it is really and deeply at odds with all classical 
monotheist religions. A non-personal God might have created humankind in Her own image as 
distributional classes of thoughts and perceptions. In Islam, for instance, God is conceived as an 
impersonal deity (see for instance Legenhausen 1986). So, it should not be so implausible for a 
theist that God designed human lives as impersonal selfless collections of entities. Contrary to what 
one may be believe at first glance, there is room for god-centered accounts of the meaning of life 
when operating under the assumption of eliminativism. In sum, eliminativism is consistent with 
God-centered accounts, but not with soul-centered ones. 
 
V. Naturalist Approaches 
Let us now turn to naturalism. Naturalism is objective or subjective depending on where the source 
of meaning stands with respect to the mind (Metz, 2002, 792). Subjective naturalism locates the 
source of meaning in the mind. Popular subjective naturalist answers to the substantive questions 
are that the meaning of life arises from experiencing feelings of satisfaction (Ayer 1990, 189-196) 
or adopting purposes and acting in order to realize them (Smart 1999). Alternatively, objective 
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naturalism locates the source of meaning only in objective features, along a pure objectivist account, 
or more commonly, in both subjective and objective mind-independent features (along a hybrid 
view). For instance, Susan Wolf endorses such a hybrid objective account, claiming that “Meaning 
arises when subjective attraction meets objective attractiveness” (Wolf 1997, 211). This objective 
attractiveness may then be construed further in terms of mind-independent values that we try to 
access–such as moral or aesthetic values. 
 How does naturalism fit with the no-self view? Naturalists regard reality as including a 
space of mind-independent or mind-dependent norms/values, with at least one of these 
norms/values having to be sought in order to achieve a meaningful life. Does the account conflict 
with eliminativism? Once again, distributional classes may do the same explanatory job as 
Cartesian egos or Humean bundles, acting as ersatz of unifying devices (cf. Benovsky 2009). An 
existential life, understood as a distributional class of experiences, may directly instantiate natural 
normative properties. There is no need to introduce further an intermediary self between the 
existential life and its normative properties. And the same holds true for any other naturalist view 
one may think about. Independently of the kind of normative properties one may wish to posit, one 
may regard life as instantiating these normative properties. The search for a meaningful life may 
then be identified with the attempt to make our lives instantiate these properties. Therefore, lives 
may be meaningful even though no one is sitting in the driving seat. Perhaps one will object that 
naturalists like Wolf do require a subject to be actively engaged in pursuing objective value. 
However, we may understand the situation in the following way: proper parts of the collections of 
entities we falsely identify as selves, may collectively instantiate normative properties, and may 
collectively pursue objective value.16 The search for meaning is genuine here–but this is not the 
quest of someone. This is the quest of a plurality that perceives–or thinks of–itself falsely as a 
singularity.  
 One possible exception, however, regarding compatibility with eliminativism may be the 
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transcendence view endorsed by Nozick (1981, chapter 6, 1989, chapter 15-16). According to the 
transcendence view, the meaning of life is grounded in the transcending of our limits in order to 
connect with larger organic unities. These organic unities are not literally organic and take their 
name by analogy with the biological realm. A unity is organic iff it has a high degree of internal 
complexity and coherence (rocks, biological entities and conscious entities are therefore organic 
unities in this sense). And the more an organic unity is complex, the more it is valuable.17 The quest 
for meaning is then construed as the aiming at transcending our limits in order to connect with other 
organic unities. As Nozick writes, contrasting meaning with value:  
 
Value involves something’s being integrated within its own boundaries, while meaning 
involves it’s having some connection beyond these boundaries. The problem of 
meaning itself is raised by the presence of limits. Thus, typically, people worry about 
the meaning of their lives when they see their existences as limited, perhaps because 
death will end up them and so mark their final limit. To seek to give life meaning is to 
seek to transcend the limits of one’s individual life. (Are there two ways to transcend 
our current limits and hence two modes of meaning: connecting with external things 
that remain external, and connecting with things so as somehow to incorporate these 
things, either within ourselves or into an enlarged identity?) (Nozick 1989, 166-167) 
We need not look beyond something to find its (intrinsic) value, whereas we do have to 
look beyond a thing to discover its meaning. (Nozick 1989, 167) 
 The reference to selves and enlarged identity raises the following question: is the 
transcendence view committed to the reality of selves? After all, if a self has to connect with 
organic unities by transcending its limits, it seems that this self has to be real in the first place. In 
order to answer this question, it is helpful to consider an interesting objection Metz (2002, 799-800) 
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addressed to Nozick, namely that, sometimes, events or actions conferring meaning to our lives are 
internal. For instance, it seems to happen when we exhibit integrity or another ethical virtue. This 
example does not involve any kind of connection with an external entity. Nozick is aware of these 
possible counter-examples and suggests that, in these particular situations, we may actually be 
connecting directly to values or “reality”. According to Metz (2002, 800), it is mysterious how this 
kind of connection is supposed to work. As a possible answer, Metz appeals to Gewirth’s view that 
the mysterious connection should be understood as self-transcendence. Knowledge sometimes 
overcomes “the limitations set by the restrictive purview of ordinary sense experience” (Gewirth, 
1998, 178) and the meaning of life depends on the use of reasons. As Metz expresses it: “self-
transcendence involves going beyond one’s animal self to a greater degree than people typically do” 
(Metz 2002, 800). Self-transcendence is thereby understood as the transcending of the animal self to 
become a rational self. 
 Now, eliminativism about the self allows for another interesting reading of self-
transcendence. Substituting collections of experiences for selves, one may contend that the meaning 
of life lies in the transcending of the limits of the apparent self, in order to conceive of or to 
perceive existential lives for what they really are. Self-transcendence would be, literally, the 
transcendence of the self. Thus, far from being at odds with eliminativism, Nozick’s naturalist 
transcendence view inherits of an interesting interpretation when we endorse eliminativism: a life is 
meaningful, to quote him again, by its “connecting with external things that remain external, and 
connecting with things so as somehow to incorporate these things, either within ourselves or into an 
enlarged identity”, but also, through a third path, by dissolving the very organic unity we are 
supposed to be, namely, by consciously erasing our perception and conception of the limits between 
the alleged self and the external world. Furthermore, realizing that there is no self could be one way 
of transcending the animal life. As we shall see, this eliminativist interpretation of the 
transcendence view bears remarkable similarities with what we find in Buddhism. 
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VI. Buddhist Traditions 
As mentioned above, Buddhism posits two kinds of truths: ultimate truth and conventional truth. In 
spite of the lack of existence tout court of the self (and persons), at first glance, life is perfectly 
meaningful: Buddhists follow the Four Nobles’ Truths (āryasatya), a practical code of conduct that 
urges us to bring the existential suffering to an end, in order to access nirvāṇa, a state of 
enlightenment. Indeed, it is part of Buddhist beliefs that we are subject to rebirth cycles, and that the 
existential suffering will continue in this infinite succession of lives. In this framework, realizing 
that there is no self is regarded as a path towards the stop of this existential suffering. Thus 
Buddhism might lead to an answer to the substantial question: a meaningful life aims at escaping 
existential suffering. Life would be precious for the very reason that it is ephemeral and offers the 
possibility to reach a positive state of absence of sufferings. Such a quest would furthermore 
instantiate nobility, as suggested by the name “Four Nobles’ Truths”, and the instantiation of this 
nobility would constitute the meaning of life. This answer to the substantive question thereby 
depends on a particular answer to the origin question: life partially draws its meaning from a mental 
subjective state, namely the realization that there is no self. Therefore, we may regard this 
spirituality as one that uses the no-self view or, more precisely, the belief in the truth of 
eliminativism, as part of what the meaning of life is. Buddhism, therefore, might not only count as a 
case of compatibility of a realist understanding of the meaning of life with eliminativism but also as 
a case in which the very meaning of life depends on the fact that there is no self. 
It is worthy of attention that if in its original form Buddhism must be regarded as a hybrid 
view–combining naturalist and supernaturalist features–a purely naturalist account is also available 
by dropping the doctrine of karma and rebirth. Indeed, by definition, supernaturalism grounds the 
meaning of life in an entity transcending the natural world (typically, the soul or God). Buddhism, 
in its original form (accepting the no-self view and the doctrine of rebirth and karma) grounds the 
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meaning of life in naturalist features (the realization that there is no self and the overcoming of 
existential suffering in nirvāṇa, or at least the project of doing so) and supernaturalist features–the 
cycles of rebirth and karma if we acknowledge that this is a transcendent principle of justice. But 
note that there is no necessary principled connection between the no-self view and the doctrine of 
karma and rebirth, and it might be argued that dropping the doctrine of rebirth helps us to make 
sense of the no-self view, two views difficult to combine.18 A modified version of Buddhism, with 
no doctrine of rebirth and karma, makes it possible to ground the meaning of life in naturalist 
features only: the no-self view and the quest of overcoming existential suffering. 
 However, the connection between the no-self view, and the practical claim that the absence 
of selves is important for the pursuit of a meaningful life is not straightforward. Indeed, it relies on a 
further substantive claim: Buddhist philosophy conceives of life as being meaningful. This claim is 
not obvious since, to my knowledge, the very notion of “meaning of life” is not to be found in the 
Buddhist literature. Therefore, one might object that Buddhism entails that life is meaningless since 
there is no self, but nonetheless, life is worth living because there is still something important to do. 
In that respect, and in order to evaluate the plausibility of the claim that a Buddhist life may be 
regarded as meaningful, in a somewhat anachronistic perspective, it will help to introduce a 
distinction between the two notions of meaningful life and life worth living (see for instance Nozick 
1989, chapter 15 and Metz, 2002, 788). A useful way to distinguish between the two notions is to 
take an example in which we do have the intuition that the presented situation is a life worth living, 
even if not a meaningful one. Take, for instance, a stamp collector. Such a person could be utterly 
absorbed in her task during her whole life, having a constant purpose, gaining pleasure and 
satisfaction from the systematical pursuit of this particular goal. But should we be willing to 
consider her as having discovered (or created) a meaning of (for) her life through this particular 
activity? I am personally inclined to answer negatively but, obviously, it depends on how liberal 
one is willing to be about the meaning of life. One may want to go pluralist, contending that there 
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are many alternative meaningful ways to live. In addition, one may contend that any conception of 
meaning one believes to be true offers a road towards a meaningful life. This is what I mean by a 
“liberal” conception of the meaning of life.19  On the contrary, it is possible to adopt a more 
restrictive position by assuming either monism (there is only one meaning of life) or a more 
restrictive form of pluralism (there are various possible meanings of life but, still, not any activity 
providing satisfaction to someone on a regular basis should count as a genuine meaning of life). In 
being either monist or restrictive pluralist, it is possible to argue that a life aiming at collecting 
stamps is not a meaningful life, although it has positive value that makes it worth living (see for 
instance Wolf 2012). 
 Equipped with this distinction between valuable/worth living lives and meaningful lives, let 
us come back to Buddhist philosophy. The following interpretation of Buddhism suggests itself as a 
plausible alternative: Buddhists believe that life is meaningless; and it is this last realization that 
grounds the positive value of life–the fact that life is worth living. One may combine the idea that 
there is no self (and so, that life is meaningless) with the idea that it should help us in the conduct of 
our life (life is valuable). In this regard, there are two main ways to go. Either the Four Nobles’ 
Truths provide us with a meaning of life or, on the contrary, they show us that life, as worthwhile as 
it is–its value being partially grounded in the no-self view–is meaningless. Then, in order to argue 
that practical Buddhist philosophy provides us with a case of belief that life is meaningful, a belief 
grounded in the further belief that there is no self, one has to show that Buddhists are not only 
believing that life is worth living for but, also, that life is meaningful. However, since the notion of 
the “meaning of life” is not to be found in the Buddhist literature, it will be hard to use Buddhist 
primary literature to settle the issue one way or another. I suspect that the answer to this question 
depends closely on how liberal we are ready to go regarding to what may count as a meaning of life. 
 Therefore, and although this interpretation depends on a particular understanding of the 
connection between the value and the meaning of life, Buddhist metaphysics and practical 
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philosophy may well offer a concrete example of how a no-self view might partially ground the 
meaning of life. Therefore, far from being an insurmountable obstacle, the no-self view offers a 
possible answer to both the substantive and the origin questions. 
Up to this point, I have been discussing mereological nihilism as a particular threat for the 
meaning of life, arising in both Buddhist and Western philosophy. But another, more radical, claim 
may be found in the Buddhist literature. I refer here to a specific Buddhist tradition discussed at 
length by Western scholars, the early Madhyamaka tradition. This tradition accepts the idea that 
everything (including material objects and selves) is empty, namely lacking substance. It is not easy 
to understand exactly what this means in the framework of Western metaphysical categories but 
what it is certain is that it cannot be identified with mereological nihilism only: mereological 
simples also come under attack. The emptiness claim seems to point towards at least two alternative 
interpretations: ontological deflationism and eliminativism about material objects and selves. 
According to the ontological deflationist interpretation of the Madhyamaka tradition–endorsed for 
instance by MacKenzie (2008)–the world is not mind-independently structured. Therefore, because 
there are no ontological categories in general (such as properties, facts, objects or events) there are 
no substances in particular. Ontological structures would be mind-dependent conventional 
projections on top of a world intrinsically free of any categorical structure.20 By contrast, according 
to the eliminativist interpretation, the world is mind-independently structured. We should not 
abandon mind-independent metaphysical categories per se. But the metaphysical categories of 
substance, object, essence and nature do not belong to the furniture of the world excluding both 
macroscopic objects and mereological simples–suggesting perhaps the conjunction of eliminativism 
and a gunk view (see Le Bihan 2013). Interestingly, the claim that everything is empty makes the 
challenge for the meaning of life even harder. Indeed, the non-existence of mereological simples 
makes it difficult to replace selves by a something else–pluralities of mereological simples in other 
Buddhist traditions–that could collectively instantiate normative properties. As an attempt to sketch 
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out a solution to this issue, we could appeal to a top-down approach, in the wake of Schaffer’s 
priority monism (2009, 2010)–the view that the whole cosmos is the most fundamental entity and 
that its parts are less fundamental–in suggesting that although no composite objects and no 
mereological simples are to be found in the fundamental world, derivative proper parts of the 
cosmos can instantiate normative properties. However, arguing that a monist interpretation of the 
Madhyamaka ontology would be sound is a delicate issue for another day. 
 To sum up, eliminativism is almost completely neutral with respect to questions about the 
meaning of life. We should not feel particularly committed towards deflationism or nihilism about 
meaning because of the no-self view, with the possible exception of the Madhyamaka tradition. 
Pluralist or monist, naturalist or supernaturalist, many conceptions of the meaning of life remain 
available to the eliminativist. As disturbing as it may seem at first glance, the no-self view does not 
pose any substantive existential threat. Life may perfectly be meaningful even if no driver is to be 
found in the driver seat. The sole constraint the no-self view places on approaches to the meaning of 
life concerns its possible origin. And, importantly, the very realization of this fact may even 
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1 For the sake of clarity, I will refer to the view that there is no meaning as “nihilism”, to the view that there are no 
material entities or selves as “eliminativism”, and to the view that mereological composition never obtains as 
“mereological nihilism”. 
2 See e.g. Le Bihan (2013, 2015). 
3 Obviously, there are many accounts that attempt to solve these problems, and most of them do not deny reality to 
material objects. I am not arguing that eliminativism is the best way to solve these problems (even though I do 
believe it is) but I am only providing a short description of why eliminativism about material objects is thought to 
provide an elegant solution to classical philosophical puzzles. 
4 A second popular approach is a top-down monist view. According to the view, the world is one, a cosmos, which 
instantiates directly natural properties without the mediation of material objects. This monist view comes then into 
two versions. According to priority monism, material objects exist derivatively but not fundamentally (Schaffer 
2009, 2010). According to existence monism, material objects do not exist (Horgan and Potr 2006). If in the present 
paper I operate under the assumption of the bottom-up approach, everything that I will write is compatible with a 
top-down approach. 
5  Jiri Benovsky has since changed his mind from reductionist realism to eliminativism about the self. See Benovsky 
(forthcoming). 
6 As we shall see, there may be a more radical interpretation of eliminativism as the view that “I” is not even 
referring to collections of mereological simples. 
7 For a discussion of the distinction between a realist bundle theory and an eliminativist bundle theory, cf. Le Bihan 
(forthcoming). For a comparison of the substratum view and the bundle view, see Benovsky (2008, 2009). 
8 My understanding of the two truths doctrine relies mainly on Siderits (2007), Westerhoff (2009, 2011) and Zahavi, 
Thompson, and Siderits (2011). 
9 Furthermore, and as suggested by their name, conventional and ultimate entities also differ in fundamentality: 
ultimate entities would be more fundamental than conventional entities. But the fundamentality claim does not play 
any role in the dilemma, what matters in this context is just the duality claim. 
10 For a discussion of the difference between reductionism and eliminativism in the context of the Buddhist tradition, 
which also hints at the distinction between the notions of self and person, see the discussion: Benovsky (2017a), 
Siderits (2017), Benovsky (2017b). 
11 Note that even if one were to accept the conventional existence of persons, the existential challenge would arise 
again from both perspectives. From the ultimate perspective persons are multiplicities of mereological atoms, 
lacking any simple or composite self, and with no ultimate unity. Could these plural persons lead a meaningful life? 
And from the conventional perspective, persons are conventional unities. Could these entities existing only by 
conventions live meaningful lives? 
12 In turn, nihilism thus construed comes into two versions: radical nihilism and mysterianism. Radical nihilism is the 
view that there is no meaningful answer to the question because there is no answer simpliciter. Mysterianism is the 
somewhat different view that there is no meaningful answer to the question because such an answer is ineffable.  
The two versions of nihilism also differ from skepticism, the view that there is a rational answer to the question, but 
one that we cannot know. 
13  I will not discuss the fact that meaning in life–conferred by some events–should be distinguished from the meaning 
of life as a whole. I will assume that the existence of meaningful events entail the meaningfulness of life as a whole. 
14 See for instance Baggini (2005). 
15 Or, alternatively, the meaning of life is grounded in both a monotheist God and souls. 
16 See Caves (2015) and Cornell (2017) for a defense of plural instantiation. The authors develop this idea in a broader 
context–ensuring that mereological nihilism is consistent with emergent properties. 
17 “Value is a matter of the internal unified coherence of a thing” (1989, 167). 
18  See Siderits (2015, section 4) for a discussion of the issue and a proposal to solve it. 
19 Cf. for instance Wolf (1997) and Kekes (2000, 30). 
20  One could object that ontological deflationism is not a proper interpretation of the emptiness claim because it 
entails that the debate between non-reductive realism (the substantial view), reductionism (the bundle view) and 
eliminativism (the no-self view) is a linguistic game: there is no genuine ontological matter of fact at stake here. 
However, ontological deflationism entails that the world has no ontological structure, and therefore is not structured 
in selves, persons, objects and mereological simples. This fits quite well with the idea that everything is empty. 
Therefore, this interpretation may not be swept aside. 
21 For helpful comments on a previous version of this draft, I would like to thank Jiri Benovsky, Karen Crowther and 
two anonymous referees. 
